Zonal Hazard Analysis examines hazards that arise from the physical location of equipment, services and people. It asks how nearby systems can affect one another, even when their functions are unrelated. It also examines how a fault can spread beyond the area where it starts.
For engineers and safety managers, the main purpose is to test whether the installed arrangement supports the safety assumptions made during design. A system can appear adequately controlled in isolation and become vulnerable when fitted beside heat sources, fluid lines, moving equipment or other safety systems.
Examine the installation as well as the function
Functional analysis considers what a system does and how failures affect its required functions. Zonal Hazard Analysis adds the physical setting: where equipment sits, how services are routed and how people reach it.
Consider an electrical junction box below a water pipe. A pipe leak can affect equipment that has no functional connection with the water system. Consider also a steam isolation valve located where escaping steam can prevent an operator from reaching it. The intended response may be unavailable in the very condition that requires it.
Physical proximity can create common cause failures or allow one failure to damage another system. These mechanisms need examination before claims of independence or redundancy can be relied upon.
Start when layout choices are still open
Begin the analysis when the project starts to define its physical arrangement. Early sketches and three-dimensional models can reveal conflicts before equipment positions and service routes become difficult to change.
Increase the detail as drawings and installation information mature. Use current layout drawings, cable and pipe routes, equipment data, access requirements and operating procedures. Record the configuration that each review covers. An attractive model is useful only if it represents the relevant installation accurately.
Check the first representative installation and, where appropriate, the completed system. Temporary cables, later modifications, insulation, supports and access restrictions can introduce conditions that were absent from the design model.
Define zones and inspect their boundaries
Divide the installation into manageable physical areas. A zone might be a machinery compartment, equipment bay, cabinet or section of a platform. Choose boundaries that help the team examine credible interactions. Do not assume that a drawing boundary will contain a hazard.
Identify equipment, materials, energy sources and people in each zone. Include shared utilities, ventilation, drains, penetrations, cable trays and escape routes. Then examine the paths by which heat, smoke, liquids, fragments or other harmful effects can enter or leave.
Review normal operation, maintenance, abnormal conditions and emergency response. A compartment with sufficient clearance in service can become congested when a panel is open or equipment is being removed.
Use focused questions to test the arrangement
A checklist can support the review, but it needs adaptation to the installation. Useful questions include:
Can moving parts, sharp edges or hot surfaces injure people or damage adjacent equipment?
Are pipes and cables adequately supported and protected against vibration, movement and chafing?
Can a fluid leak reach electrical equipment, hot surfaces or another safety system?
Can fire, flooding, radiation or released fragments affect several protective systems?
Can personnel inspect, isolate and remove equipment without entering an uncontrolled hazard?
Can maintenance damage a neighbouring system or defeat a protective barrier?
Involve the disciplines needed to answer these questions. Designers can explain installation constraints. Operators and maintainers can identify practical access problems and task demands. Specialists may be needed to assess fire, electrical, structural, environmental or human factors issues.
Check whether independence survives a local event
Redundant channels can share a vulnerability if their cables, fluid lines or power supplies occupy the same exposed area. Separate equipment labels do not establish physical independence. Examine the initiating event, its reach and the protection of each affected channel.
Where separation is proposed, justify the distance and routing against the hazard. Where a barrier is proposed, define the performance it must provide and how that performance will be verified. Check penetrations, supports and ventilation paths that can bypass the barrier.
Remote isolation can help when local access is lost. However, its actuator, power supply, control wiring and operating position also need protection from the initiating event. Otherwise, the same event can defeat both local and remote responses.
Case study United Airlines Flight 232
On 19 July 1989, United Airlines Flight 232 suffered a catastrophic failure of its tail-mounted engine. The US National Transportation Safety Board reports that discharged fan rotor parts led to loss of all three hydraulic systems powering the flight controls. The aircraft later crashed during an attempted landing at Sioux City. [1]
The NTSB identified inspection and quality-control deficiencies that allowed a fan-disk fatigue crack to remain undetected. It also found that the debris distribution and energy exceeded the protection provided by the hydraulic-system design features. [1]
For Zonal Hazard Analysis, the lesson is to examine how a local event can defeat several systems that support the same safety function. Review the spatial relationships, damage paths and limits of protection. This lesson does not establish that a zonal review alone would have prevented the accident; engine integrity and inspection were also central issues.
Record findings and verify the installation
For each finding, record the zone, affected equipment, initiating event and possible consequences. Identify the current safeguards, evidence gaps and required changes. Assign an owner and a completion criterion. Link the finding to the Hazard Log and relevant safety requirements.
Resolve issues through justified changes to layout, routing, shielding, isolation or working arrangements. Verify the actual installation against the agreed requirements. A drawing change alone does not prove that the physical system meets them.
Repeat the affected review after modifications, rerouting or changes in operation and maintenance. Zonal Hazard Analysis complements other hazard analyses by checking the physical conditions on which their safety conclusions depend.
Hashtags
#ZonalHazardAnalysis, #SystemSafety, #SafetyEngineering, #SystemsIntegration, #HazardAnalysis, #CommonCauseFailure, #SafetyAssurance
Sources
[1] US National Transportation Safety Board. United Airlines Flight 232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10. Investigation DCA89MA063 and report AAR-90-06. Accident of 19 July 1989. Read source

